avari | haroon moghul

Politics and New Media at Berkeley: Islam, the Internet and Futures

On Thursday, October 15th, I was privileged to take part in a conference at the University of California-Berkeley, on Islam and New Media.  For those of you who are so interested, the full conference is embedded below.  The full length of the program is about 2:22 (that's hours); my formal segment is at 1:10:30 (watch someone get up and leave right before my bit), and then of course I am taking part in the Q&A section (1:52:00).  Brilliant Muslim playwright and generally very cool guy, Wajahat Ali, moderates.  My topic was a set of reflections based on my recent experiences with and involvement with the Islamic Center at NYU, and especially our khutbah podcasts.

My hope was to not define trends, but to suggest directions in which Muslim discourses are moving (among others, of course.)  I am so happy to have had the chance of being on this panel: Every speaker brought a very different perspective to the discussion, and helped to produce a fantastic discussion.  Not to mention how pleased I am that so many areas of the Muslim world were represented, including Malaysia and Indonesia, which explicably and inexcusably are oft ommitted.

Yes, I am wearing a pink shirt.

Islam in India: My Lecture, This Wednesday (10/28) at Camden Community College

This Wednesday, Oct. 28th, I will be giving an introductory lecture, open to the public at no-cost, on the roots and present realities of the Muslim communities of India.  This lecture will take place at the Blackwood, NJ, campus of Camden Community College, Camden, New Jersey. (Campus map; directions; event location: Civic Center, Connector Building).

The lecture begins at 7:00 p.m.; all interested must register in advance.    For more information on the lecture series, here is an intro, and here is the official flier with full details and directions (.pdf).

The lecture summary, as advertised:

From Roots to Realities: India’s Muslim Communities Today / India Lecture Series
Date: Wednesday, October 28, 2009
Time: 7 p.m.
Location: Civic Hall, Connector Building, Blackwood Campus
Description: Haroon S. Moghul, doctoral candidate at Columbia University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, will discuss the history, ideological/theological and social roots of India’s Muslim community.

We ask that all participants register in advance to guarantee seating is available and in order to prepare sufficient materials to be given out at the door. If you are unable to do so, please call the office the day of the event to register by phone or online to register via our Web site: www.camdencc.edu/civiccenter

All lectures will be held in the Civic Hall located inside the Connector Building on the Blackwood Campus of the College.

View Lecture Series Brochure and Registration Form

Leaving Afghanistan

Sharing a number of links with you for the weekend.  

I am pretty convinced that there is no military solution to this conflict, and that we will have to engage the Taliban; as distasteful as it is, we must distinguish between al Qaeda and the Taliban's ambitions.  But more than matters of morality and even issues of legacy, there are two deeper national security questions at work: We are not the global power some neocons thought (or think) we are.  We cannot sustain this war, financially or politically, without massive infusions from allied forces, and those will not be forthcoming, which is the lead-in to the second question: Why fight a war that could destroy NATO, when the chances of "winning" are so slim?  

Some people ask how it is a power declines and another power rises.  It's because of bad decisions at extremely crucial moments.  There are transitional periods in world history, and often time those transitional moments are made still more crucial because one power made a very bad choice and found itself paying the consequences of that choice for years down the road, while the other power(s) made smarter choices.  (Note: Intention doesn't have to count.)  You cannot always go back and change a choice, and pretend nothing happened.  When we embarked on our two most recent wars in the last eight years, we were not given a clear strategy, nor did we bother to realize that we are no longer in the colonial era.  As we went on into two wars that, although they did not cost the number of lives Vietnam did, ended up costing us probably $1 trillion, future competitors of the United States were putting massive sums of money into more relevant causes.  

Grey Dey Relief

So crummy and cloudy crumbly outside.  Just listen to Javed Bashir and pretend you're at Coke Studio.  Mmm, Coke.

Tonight is Night No. 27, overwhelmingly practiced as the most likely night of Qadr (of the last 10, odd nights.)  God is Odd. 

Americans Are Scarcely Prepared for a Middle East and South Asia Firestorm

There is a firestorm ahead in the Middle East for which neither the U.S. government nor the U.S. public is prepared. They seem scarcely aware how close it is on the horizon or how ferocious it will be. The U.S. government (and therefore almost inevitably the U.S. public) is deluding itself massively about its capacity to handle the situation in terms of its stated objectives. The storm will go from Iraq to Afghanistan to Pakistan to Israel/Palestine, and in the classic expression "it will spread like wildfire."

Let us start with Iraq. The United States has signed a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Iraq, which went into effect on July 1. It provided for turning over internal security to the Iraqi government and, in theory, essentially restricting U.S. forces to their bases and to some limited role in training Iraqi troops. Some of the wording of this agreement is ambiguous. Deliberately so, since that was the only way both sides would sign it.

Even the first months of operation show how poorly this agreement is operating. The Iraqi forces have been interpreting it very strictly, formally forbidding both joint patrols and also any unilateral U.S. military actions without prior detailed clearance with the government. It has gotten to the point that Iraqi forces are stopping U.S. forces from passing checkpoints with supplies during daytime hours.

The U.S. forces have been chafing. They have tried to interpret the clause guaranteeing them the right of self-defense far more loosely than the Iraqi forces want. They are pointing to the upturn in violence in Iraq and therefore implicitly to the incapacity of Iraqi forces to guarantee order.

The general commanding the U.S. forces, Ray Odierno, is obviously extremely unhappy and is patently scheming to find excuses to reestablish a direct U.S. role. Recently, he met with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki of Iraq and President Masoud Barzani of the Kurdish Regional Government. Odierno sought to persuade them to permit tripartite (Iraqi/Kurdish/American) joint patrols in Mosul and other areas of northern Iraq, in order to prevent or minimize violence. They politely agreed to consider his proposal. Unfortunately for Odierno, his plan would require a formal revision of the SOFA agreement.

Originally, there was supposed to be a referendum in the beginning of July on popular approval of the SOFA agreement. The United States was afraid of losing the vote, which would have meant that all U.S. forces would have had to be out of Iraq by Dec. 31, 2010, one full year earlier than the theoretical date in the SOFA agreement.

The United States thought it was very clever in persuading al-Maliki to postpone this referendum to January 2010. Now it will be held in conjunction with the national elections. In the national elections, everyone will be seeking to obtain votes. No one is going to be campaigning in favor of a "yes" vote on the referendum. Lest this be in any doubt, al-Maliki is submitting a project to the Iraqi parliament that will permit a simple majority of "no" votes to annul the agreement. There will be a majority of "no" votes. There may even be an overwhelming majority of "no" votes. Odierno should be packing his bags now. I'll bet he still has the illusion that he can avoid the onset of the firestorm. He can't.

What will happen next? At the present, but this may change between now and January, it looks like al-Maliki will win the election. He will do this by becoming the number one champion of Iraqi nationalism. He will make deals with all and sundry on this basis. Iraqi nationalism at the moment doesn't have much to do with Iran or Saudi Arabia or Israel or Russia. It means first of all liberating Iraq from the last vestiges of U.S. colonial rule, which is how almost all Iraqis define what they have been living under since 2003.

Will there be internal violence in Iraq? Probably, though possibly less than Odierno and others expect. But so what? Iraqi "liberation" - which is what the entire Middle East will interpret a "no" vote on the referendum to be - will immediately have a great impact on Afghanistan. There people will say, if the Iraqis can do it, so can we.

Of course, the situation in Afghanistan is different, very different, from that of Iraq. But look at what is going on now with the elections in Afghanistan. We have a government put into power to contain and destroy the Taliban. The Taliban have turned out to be more tenacious and militarily effective than any one seemed ever to anticipate. Even the tough U.S. commander there, Stanley McChrystal, has recognized that. The U.S. military is now talking of "succeeding" in perhaps a decade. Soldiers who think they have a decade to win a war against insurgents have clearly not been reading military history.

Notice the Afghan politicians themselves. Three leading candidates for the presidency, including President Hamid Karzai, debated on television the current internal war. They agreed on one thing. There must be some kind of political negotiations with the Taliban. They differed on the details. The U.S. (and NATO) forces are there ostensibly to destroy the Taliban. And the leading Afghan politicians are debating how to come to political terms with them. There is a serious disjuncture here of appreciation of realities, or perhaps of political objectives.

The polls - for what they are worth - are showing that the majority of Afghans want the NATO forces to leave and the majority of U.S. voters want the same thing. Now look ahead to January 2010, when the Iraqis vote the United States out of Iraq. Remember that, before the Taliban came to power, the country was the site of fierce and ruthless fighting among competing warlords, each with different ethnic bases, to control the country.

The United States was actually relieved when the Pakistani-backed Taliban took power. Order at last. There turned out to be a minor problem. The Taliban were serious about sharia and friendly to the emergent al-Qaeda. So, after 9/11, the United States, with west European approval and United Nations sanction, invaded. The Taliban were ousted from power - for a little while.

What will happen now? The Afghans will probably revert to the nasty continuing inter-ethnic wars of the warlords, with the Taliban just one more faction. The U.S. public's tolerance for that war will evaporate entirely. All the internal factions and many of the neighbors (Russia, Iran, India, and Pakistan) will remain to fight over the pieces.

And then stage three - Pakistan. Pakistan is another complicated situation. But none of the players there trust the United States. And the polls there show that the Pakistani public thinks that the greatest danger to Pakistan is the United States, and that by an overwhelming vote. The traditional enemy, India, is far behind the United States in the polls. When Afghanistan crumbles into a full-fledged civil war, the Pakistani army will be very busy supporting the Taliban. They cannot support the Taliban in Afghanistan while fighting them in Pakistan. They will no longer be able to accept U.S. drones bombing in Pakistan.

So then comes stage four of the firestorm - Israel/Palestine. The Arab world will observe the collapse of U.S. projects in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The U.S. project in Israel/Palestine is a peace deal between the Israelis and the Palestinians. The Israelis are not going to budge an inch. But neither now, and especially after the rest of the firestorm, are the Palestinians. The one consequence will be the enormous pressure that other Arab states will put upon Fatah and Hamas to join forces. This will be over Mahmoud Abbas's dead body - which might literally be the case.

The whole Obama program will have gone up in flames. And the Republicans will make hay with it. They will call U.S. defeat in the Middle East "betrayal" and it is obvious now that there is a large group inside the United States very receptive to such a theme.

One either anticipates firestorms and does something useful, or one gets swept up in them.

by Immanuel Wallerstein

The World is The E.U. and al Qaeda

I still cannot believe that the following was written, and published, in Newsweek.  I was going to be judicious, but this is unacceptable.  There is no longer any excuse for hack bloviating, as follows:

Now, with the EU pushing its boundaries into the Balkans up to Turkey, and with Al Qaeda clamoring that there is a war between the "Muslim world" and the West, there is no longer a gray area in which Turkey can position itself: it must become an EU member and part of the West, or else fold into the Muslim world, as per Al Qaeda's vision. Sarkozy should be alarmed about an alienated Turkey on Europe's eastern borders.

Yes, Soner, that's exactly it!  Either the E.U., or al Qaeda.  These are the considerations that power EU expansion policy, and these should be the terms on which we understand the evolution of the EU and a Turkish trajectory that goes from late Ottoman to AKP: By way of Bin Laden.  This is almost the most absurd thing I have ever read, and I have read many, many things.  I believe that we must grow, mentally, beyond such senility -- never mind such rank racist nonsense.  Even if Turkey doesn't join the EU, that does not mean that Turkey will fail to grow and mature.  The idea that only through adherence to European standards can a society develop itself is disproved everyday; it was disproved when Pakistanis turned to the streets in the thousands to demand the reinstatement of their Chief Justice, and it is disproved when Iranians bravely protest the results of the current election.  Never mind the changes, good and bad, that so many other societies have gone through.  (I suppose Nelson Mandela was an EU employee). 

But wait, let me share with you what is by far the best part: "There is no longer a gray area"?  Got that?  No longer.  No longer!  But why?  What changed?  Is Soner arguing that, after 9/11, we must base all future policy decisions on al Qaeda actions?   In other words, make al Qaeda the frame by which to judge -- which is, by the by, a rather frightening road to go down.  You be the judge.  Did the author of the essay above suddenly stop thinking, but continue writing?  Should someone call Dr. House to explore and explain, with far more caustic wit than I in all my life could muster, how such a strange event has come to pass?  Truly disappointing and, still more, deeply worrying.  But it really is that easy to say something foolish and pass it off as deep analysis.  (Kind of like this blog post, wherein I wasted my time on a nonthought.)

A Bubble Burst Before it Began

As 280 Palestinians have been killed in two days of fighting, and one Israeli, one person is conspicuously absent: Barack Obama.  His voice has not been heard when, considering the scope of the crisis, it should certainly be part of the conversation.  Juan Cole notes: "5% of all the Palestinians they have killed since the beginning of 2001."

If Obama does not say something meaningful, impartial and serious, his dreams of helping restore America's position in the Muslim world and the Arab world are over before they began -- all his talk of hope and change, just wind from the mouth.  Americans want to think that everything can be fixed with just a better man at the top, a stronger, more respectful leader...

So where is this leader that will change America's relationship with the world?  What is his opinion?  How will he change things in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Pakistan and the like?  He is vacationing, kind of like another President.  Can he not issue a statement, to clue us in to how his new policies -- and his spectacularly popular Sec. of State -- will constitute a change?

Thank you for voting.

Pakistan, Bollywood, Mumbai, Nationalism, Gay Marriage, Muslims

"It seems quite certain that the terrorists who attacked the financial capital were trained in Pakistan. The outrages have sparked a wave of indignation among the middle class. Demonstrations have been held in the major cities, calling for revenge, in particular for strikes against training camps in Pakistan. The models held up here are Israel and the United States; if they can "take out" individual terrorists and invade whole countries, ask some Indians, why not we?" [link]

Militants blasted their way into two transport terminals in Pakistan on Sunday and torched more than 160 vehicles destined for U.S.-led troops in Afghanistan, in the biggest assault yet on a vital military supply line, officials said.  Terminal manager Kifayatullah Khan said armed men flattened the gate before dawn with a rocket-propelled grenade, shot dead a guard and set fire to a total of 106 vehicles, including about 70 Humvees.  [link]

Just three years ago, the central government still controlled the provinces near Kabul. But years of mismanagement, rampant criminality, and mounting civilian casualties have led to a spectacular resurgence of the Taliban and other related groups. Today, the Islamic Emirate enjoys de facto control in large parts of the country's south and east. According to ACBAR, an umbrella organization representing more than 100 aid agencies, insurgent attacks have increased by 50% over the past year. Foreign soldiers are now dying at a higher rate here than in Iraq.  [link, adding: The Taliban have changed: "Last year, for instance, Mullah Omar issued an edict declaring music and parties -- banned in the Taliban's previous incarnation -- permissible."]

Some Stupidity Beggars Belief

My last posts drew what is, for this blog, a high number of comments (like, 9 total yaar), some of which were intriguing and offered more resources, and two of which were astonishingly dim.  One commentator noted,

"I find it amusing that people think India cannot contain a fragmented Pakistan as they don't see history. Pakistani WAS divided once before - 1971 - and India had no resulting spike in violence or whatever."

First off, Pakistan's split, after its military practiced ethnic cleansing and engaged in widespread human rights violations, led to the emergence of another nation-state.  (Take that, man-who-sees-up-his-rear-end.)  Nation-states are good at dealing with other nation-states; India's challenge, like Pakistan's and America's, is dealing with non-state actors with increased mobility, more global ambition and more ruthless tactics and technology. 

I'm not predicting Pakistan breaks into two or three independent countries; I'm forewarning of the danger however remote of Pakistan fragmenting in the manner of Somalia, Iraq or Afghanistan, with the attendant violence likely to erupt and seep and ruin.  Not to mention that an independent Bangladesh, grateful to India, is very different than a destabilized, ungoverned Pakistan with an open border from Kashmir to Kabul.  That is a security and political nightmare.

Secondly, this confidence is absurd: India's security forces took days to respond to the attacks in Mumbai and contain them, implying that India is as lost in the face of non-state actors' violence as Pakistan is.  Recent news confirms Indian security forces' inadequacy.

The better comment was by a man whose head has apparently long ago abandoned his body, who did to his higher faculties what Iranians did to the Shah, when he actually had the courage to type for all electronic time, "No community ever resorted to killing innocent passer-bys."  Except, apparently, Muslims.  This comment is so stupid as to merit no response from me except to draw your attention, and the commentators, to the stupidness of the comment's stupidity.  Really, if I have to draw out the fact that explanation, strategy and justification are not one word in the English language, I will scream.  You cannot hear it.  But it will happen. 

Elsewhere:

Wajahat Ali, a fixture in the internet media, now takes on the case of the Holy Land Foundation.  This is brave stuff, published by The Guardian.

The Episcopal Church is splitting over, in part, the issues surrounding homosexuality.

Ex-U.S. official argues that Pakistan's military was responsible for the attacks in Mumbai.  How this has all been confirmed, I am not sure.  Because the Indian government said so!  I do not doubt that it is likely, but I do wonder about the ease with which a full narrative has been constructed, especially when this is backed up by American intelligence agencies that recently seem to miss the obvious and end up making one bad choice after another -- why are Indian agencies any different?  How can the operation still be under investigation and yet concluded?

The challenge here is not to draw a narrative that brings us to a dead-end, too: If Pakistan is responsible, then Pakistan must be punished. (Note: It doesn't matter if Pakistan is responsible. It just matters if that's what the right people say at the right time.) And that will only further increase violence in the region, and empower extremist elements in the country against that country's limited ability to fight monsters in part born of its own, well, stupidity. 

Pakistan's foreign policy has alternated quite often between unthinking bombast and cruel and unusual means of shooting oneself in the foot (along with many others.)  The country needs to rethink itself, but its government is to weak to begin the process in a hostile climate.  That is the Pakistani tragedy, alongside a Mumbai tragedy, a broken Subcontinent that requires will, patience, endurance and sacrifice to fix.  Indian aggressiveness right now is the worst possible outcome, not only because it is the outcome that the attackers wanted, though that should be enough to give some pause.

What Mumbai Means for Pakistan

India has demanded that Pakistan hand over 20 fugitives.  Or else.  Or else what, exactly?  War?  If India's government accepts that Pakistan's government was not responsible for the attack (that is after all not the same thing as saying that the attackers came from, or were trained in, a "foreign country"), then this is to say the least unhelpful.  Pakistan is facing a terrorism problem more severe than India's and more complicated; this kind of rhetoric handicaps the Pakistani government -- just as Obama's rhetoric, during the campaign -- when it needs a full spectrum strategy to deal with a terrible and tremendous threat to its stability and sovereignty. 

Rightfully, India and Indians are angry at the vile attacks in Mumbai, but a response must consider the long-term consequences of further destabilizing Pakistan -- not only for the Pakistani population, which has also been savaged by this disgusting violence, but for the chaos it would unleash on India and Indians.

India's exaggerated claims aside, India cannot militarily, financially or politically contain a fragmented Pakistan, and would face, potentially, a serious wave of violence that would try the state and perhaps handicap it severely.  This is a worst-case scenario, but when dealing with two nuclear powers, side by side, with a history of violence internally and externally, it is good to consider worst-case scenarios.

Simultaneously, Pankaj Mishra has chimed in, speaking of a Kashmir connection.  He also notes the rhetorical side of the militants' attacks:

MIDWAY through last week’s murderous rampage in Mumbai, one of the suspected gunmen at the besieged Jewish center called a popular Indian TV channel. Speaking in Urdu (the primary language of Pakistan and many Indian Muslims), he ranted against the recent visit of an Israeli general to the Indian-ruled section of the Kashmir Valley. Referring to the Pakistan-backed insurgency in the valley, and the Indian military response to it, he asked, “Are you aware how many people have been killed in Kashmir?”

In a separate phone call, another gunman invoked the oppression of Muslims by Hindu nationalists and the destruction of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya in 1992. Such calls were the only occasions on which the militants, whom initial reports have tied to the Pakistani jihadist group Lashkar-e-Taiba, offered a likely motive for their indiscriminate slaughter. Their rhetoric seems all too familiar. Nevertheless, it shows how older political conflicts in South Asia have been rendered more noxious by the fallout from the “war on terror” and the rise of international jihadism.

We should, at the least, now what is being said, and about what, and why.  This especially is key:

Pakistan’s new civilian government is too weak to control either the extremist groups within the country or the various rogue elements within its military and intelligence. The American military was reported to have started bombing supposed terrorist hideouts inside Pakistan’s borders even as General Musharraf stumbled to the exit. As its increasingly desperate pleas to the Bush administration to stop the attacks go unheeded, Pakistan’s government appears pathetically helpless to its own citizens.

Juan Cole cites reports that Mumbai's Muslim community has refused to bury the militants responsible.  There's a short but interesting debate in the comments section.