If Scholars and Politics Collide

Events over the last few days have deeply concerned me. 

Watching the Grand Ayatollah at the top of the Islamic Republic deliver a sermon in which he made no meaningful concessions to the opposition (in fact, he made no real concessions whatsoever), I thought about how strange it is the way history works.  The thesis eventually produces an antithesis.  Sometimes it takes centuries, but it happens.  How odd it was to find Khamenei allude to the tragic events at Karbala, where, only a few decades after the birth of Islam, Husayn, may God be pleased with him, the grandson of the Prophet Mohammed, peace be upon him, was cut down (and most of his remaining family as well.)  Those events have become a mainstay in much of Muslim popular culture (including throughout the Sunni world), literature and imagination and have done the same for the articulation of an unparalleled protest tradition.  Yet I watched and wondered: how does the protest tradition become the state?  If the state holds an increasing monopoly on religious interpretation, what happens to the protest tradition? 

More meaningfully, considering the structure of Shi'i practice, what happens when the major figures of present scholarship collide, not just on matters of religious practice but politics as well?  I honestly don't know, but I feel it's worth considerable reflection and should be of concern.  When scholarship worries more about maintaining order than guiding and edifying, that scholarship will eventually fade -- and one wonders what then occurs.  If Sistani and Khamenei disagree, publicly, about matters as important as the events of the last week (thinking hypothetically), then clearly the interests of religion and politics clash.  I have not read any serious argument which considers the Iranian Rahbar to be greater in stature than Sistani, who is arguably the leading Shi'i cleric of our age and indeed one of the great scholars of the Muslim world. 

This where I feel the history of Sunni Islam proves instructive.

Over the last 200 years, the Muslim world had been rather uniformly colonized.  Very few areas escaped from direct European control; practically none escaped from some form of indirect control or regular foreign interference.  This was disastrous for the Muslim world as a whole, but most disastrous for the Sunni world, as in major Sunni Muslim states, the clergy was often subordinate to the state in a way that did not hold in the Shia tradition.  This proved to be a bad idea for the ages.  When foreign troops landed, governments were overthrown and endowments seized, scholarship found itself without resources or strategies for recovering its previous role.  Today, far too many Sunni scholars are perceived, rightly or not, as no more than outmoded tools of the domestically oppressive and internationally impotent state.  They have very little credibility for this reason, which leaves an immense gap of authoritativeness often filled by extreme or marginal voices, many of which have no training in the tradition and end up agitating for positions deeply harmful to society, religiosity and human dignity.

The Shia scholarly tradition has fared much, much better.  I could name only a handful -- Fadlallah, Sadr, Sistani, Montazeri, Khomeini, Khatami -- and few could argue that these were not among the most influential personalities of the Muslim world or still are today.  Take for example Muhammad Khatami, who although not an ayatollah is nevertheless an 'alim (properly, a Hujjat al-Islam).  Is there any Muslim cleric from the Sunni tradition who commands as much respect, admiration and influence as he does, globally speaking?  He was the leader of a massive reform movement that captured the attention of the world; he broadcast a message of dialogue between civilizations that represents one of the most successful initiatives originating in the Muslim world which embraced the wider world and inspired it -- as once Islam inspired so many, so broadly.  How many other scholars can do so, or could even try to?  There are numerous reasons for the vigor and vitality of the Shia tradition, many of them relating to historical processes and decisions which have elevated the profile of these scholars and made them voices to be heard, not just within a select tradition but with weight on the planetary scale.

Part of the success must go to a system that produces scholars and yet depends on community supports and mutual acknowledgment, both by scholars and by "laypersons", elevating the best, most compelling and attractive personalities and minds, without instituting any kind of rigid structure or hierarchy.  That flexibility and that scholastic seriousness has already been deeply threatened by the events of the last week, the full effects we will not see for years (In triumph often are the seeds of downfall, especially when we are unable to conceive the chance of overreach.)  When scholars clash over politics, and one reading is privileged over another, then that privilege becomes a matter of imbalance.  All the more threatening to a tradition because that privilege is tied not to stronger arguments or more persuasive reasoning but to the institutions of a state, which inevitably affect religious opinion and moral character and from there, reputation and reliability (read: the ruination of the Christian right when blinded by the might.)  I am not so simplistic as to propose that there can be a clean line between religion and politics; that probably could never be accomplished, as neither religion nor politics are like Lego blocks which can be placed on opposite ends of a room.  But when religion and politics become isomorphic with each other, then certainly there should be cause for concern.

I'd like to know what readers think: how does the Iranian structure and ideology of velayat-i-faqih affect the authority and prestige of other scholars, including those maraji' who are more esteemed by the community than the supreme leader himself.

Comments

[Mohammed Husain]

Haroon,

You raise an important question. The independence of Shi'i scholars in history in a way priveleged them. Now with the emergence of a state at the top of whom is a religious scholar, there isn't such stark independence. So then, have we moved back in time? Are we setting ourselves up for disaster.

Well, a couple points are in order. One I don't think the 'ulama and the state have merged completely despite having heavyweight religious scholars in the government with a great deal of political power. There are many maraje' who stand outside the state and who have large followings (probably at least 7 or 8 in Iran), and also other maraje' elsewhere in other countries, like Ayat. Sistani. They will always maintain a great deal of latent political power because their authority comes through the many many years of studying and teaching, and also the large following that is required for them to be recognized as marja'. Once they attain this level of scholarship it is difficult for even the state to strip them of legitimacy at least as far as their rulings go. And if those marja' were to even come close to a consensus on any matter, that would have huge implications if it was directed against the state. It should be remembered that though Khamene'i is the velayat al-faqih, that doesn't mean that Iranians or any other shi'i muslims are compelled to follow him as a marja'. Also remember the expediency council supervises the leader's performance, so this is another place where the battle of interpretation

The second thing: one of the reasons we see a progressive creative synthesis coming out of Iran is because Islam is no longer just playing an oppositional role as it does in so many other places. It has to actually negotiate with modernity, in a way that is not necessary when it stands on the sidelines as simply an opposition. So for instance, you see that in family law in Iran, its required that if a man seeks to take a second wife he requires the permission of the first. This, to me, is the development of Islamic law. It becomes part of Islamic law, and not just Iranian civil law because its ratified by 'ulama are seen to have religious authority. Another example, biomedical technology and cloning research is being funded and promoted in Iran because of the clear rulings given by the religious leadership and ultimately their encouragement of it. (Check out an interview with Dr. Nasr, the man who cloned the first goat in the middle east: http://www.presstv.com/programs/player/?id=98553, in which he speaks about this). Another example would be abortion laws in Iran, that permit the abortion of fetus before 120 days if the fetus is shown to have a recognized devastating disease.

Now going back to your original point. You are right there is no guarantee that religion and politics won't go sour. But it should be remembered that though there might be some superficial similarities, velayat al-faqih, as defined in the Iranian constitution is nothing like the papacy, in that the velayat al-faqih is more than anything the arbiter of factional disputes within the government. He does not propose or ratify laws that might reflect his particular understanding of Islam. (the parliament proposes (mostly non-clerics), the GC ratifies (mostly clerics)). Many of the domestic functions of the government occur at other levels, so that in most instances the VF is trying to build consensus among disputing parties rather than imposing a novel, decisive position.

[Mohammed Husain]

Haroon,

Check out the commentary of Seyyed Mohammad Marandi, professor of North American studies at Tehran University, who himself voted for Mousavi.

http://english.aljazeera.net/programmes/insidestory/2009/06/200961613230105712.html

Also on NPR:

http://www.onpointradio.org/2009/06/election-and-tension-in-iran

And an old interview with Guernica magazine:
http://www.guernicamag.com/interviews/506/teaching_north_american_studie/

[Haroon Moghul]

Your points are intriguing, and I am aware of all these decisions. But your points are weakened by your argument that the Supreme Leader is a superintendent; he no longer is that. He is now a politician, choosing sides (what is and is not true is not as important in this case, as Hasan/wakeup pointed out, but what the image is in the minds of many Iranians.) The system has lost an aura, and to reinforce it with state authority means a religious office, dependent on a high degree of respect for the presumed impartiality of an office, makes the politicization of religion still more dangerous. There is no going back after this, and it is hard to see how the system will not damage the Shi'i 'ulama through such politicization, violence and partisanship.

That too is a part of politics, no?

Thanks for the links.

[Haroon Moghul]

Salam,

You wrote:

"Many of the domestic functions of the government occur at other levels, so that in most instances the VF is trying to build consensus among disputing parties rather than imposing a novel, decisive position."

Except in this one glaring instance, where he is in fact, as you correctly stated, "imposing" ... a "decisive position". He is now part of one faction, instead of head of the state. That is the reality of things; the country is sharply divided, with clerics on both sides, and Khamenei picked one side (and ran w/ it.) He now disagrees with major maraje', except that he can put them under house arrest and penalize them, and they cannot do the same. And he is not even their equal in scholarship.

That's what I'm driving at. It's quite dangerous. Maybe not now, maybe in a few years -- maybe in decades. But when religion and power fuse and society divides...

[Mohammed Husain]

No doubt, Khamene'i has made a decisive decision favoring one faction.

I wonder though, how much of this division that we are witnessing is the result of the mixing of religion and power; and how much of it is do to other particularities between the candidates and the election process. I think there is a tendency as Westerners, to look at Iran and disproportionately attribute its problems to a lack of secularity. Their might be other explanations, but usually this one is favored. That's not to say that we should never appeal to such an explanation, only that we should be aware that such a tendency exists.

Anyone who's followed Iranian politics knows that the level of mudslinging in this election has been unprecedented (i'm not suggesting that you don't know this). I think that really charged and emotionally intensified atmosphere to the point that some sort of clashes became a real possibility. Of course, one can't ignore the way that Ahmadinejad's policies themselves polarized people and other such factors. But the election campaigning process build of a level of emotional fervor that I think has exploded.